COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"Will ye NOW hear, O foolish people, which have eyes, and see not; which have ears, and hear not?"—
JER. chap. V. v. 21.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

Will nothing, oh, people of England, short of destruction itself, convince you that you are on the road to destruction? Will you, in spite of the awful admonition of events, in spite of experimental conviction, in spite of truths that you acknowledge, still listen to the falsehoods of your deceivers? When we look back upon the year that has just past over our heads; when we recal to mind the occurrences of the winter and the spring; when we think of the conduct of Lord Melville and of the efforts made in his behalf by those who are still entrusted with the management of our affairs; when we recur to the enormous grants in pensions and in sinecure places, during last year, and reflect upon the numerous and heavy taxes imposed upon us; when we recollect the boasts, the vaunting promises, of the ministers, and compare them with the events of the war: after such a retrospect, is it possible for us not to be impressed with the most serious apprehensions for the future? Can there be, in the whole nation, one sensible man, who does not perceive, that, unless some great change speedily takes place, this country must fall beneath the power of its enemy? Can there be one such man, who any longer entertains the hope of seeing that power resisted by our present councils and our present system; by those councils and by that system, coeval with which the power of France has been constantly increasing, her conquests pushing forward, first into Holland, across all those memorable barriers, which the courage of our ancestors and the wisdom of former statesmen had raised and maintained against her; next, to the banks of the Rhine, taking in, on that side, the countries and the fortresses that had ever been a formidable and an effectual check to her encroachments; next, across the Alps, that obstacle to her attempts upon Italy, and, continuing on to the Po and the Adige, connecting, finally, by a solemn act of sovereignty, the whole country to the dominions of France; and, lastly, by the operations of only one campaign, carrying her arms and her municipal authority, from the confines of Switzerland to those of Hungary, and extending her absolute sway, from the latter country, including its capital, westward to the Rhine, and from the Danube southward to the Mediterranean sea. With this map of the progress of French power before his eyes, and with his mind duly impressed with the persuasion, that the whole force of this mighty empire, fed by inexhaustible resources of every description, directed by those talents under which so many numerous armies have fallen, and waiting patiently for the hour of advantage; thus seeing and thus persuaded, what man, having any pretensions to understanding, and unbribed by his selfishness, will say, that there is hope of salvation for the country, under the present councils and system?——Blind-folded, and descending gradually, we arrive, without a sense of danger, at the bottom of a precipice, which, to have viewed from the top, would have terrified us from making the first step. If, just a century ago, in the princely and glorious reign of Queen Anne, when, (with an annual revenue of only *four millions*) England was the arbitress in the affairs of Europe; when, laying all petty considerations aside, she stood forward, upon the great principles of public law, to maintain the balanced power of Europe, and thereby to preserve her rising generation from the dangers attendant upon the aggrandizement of France; when her armies were, on the one side, fighting the battles of Austria in the fields of Spain, and when, on the other, they were, in conjunction with the Austrians, defeating, routing, the grand French army and taking their general, upon the very spot, which has just witnessed the surrender of the grand Austrian army at the summons of the French; when, so honourable, so generous, so just, were the views, so open and so wise was the conduct, and so great was the name of England, that, whether in political or military arrangements, councils and senates waited for the communication of her will; when at the Hague and at Vienna no great measure of state was adopted without the approbation of the English cabinet, no measure

of war without that of the English general: if, in the times which immediately succeeded this glorious epoch, men could have foreseen whereunto the funding and taxing system would finally lead; if they could have foreseen, that it would, at last, fall into the hands of a man, formed by nature for pushing it to its utmost bounds, and giving to it all its powers of sapping, of subverting, and of destroying; if they could have foreseen this, they, surely, would have recoiled with horror, and have hastily retracted their steps. This foresight they, unhappily, had not; and, their sons descended imperceptibly to the state in which they were found by Mr. Pitt. Since his time the descent has been rapid indeed! But, such is the nature of the system, and so sedulously has its means of giving ministerial power been attended to, that the reason and spirit of the nation, after now-and-then an ineffectual struggle, seem to have been finally subdued by it.——If, however, there remain the means of restoration; if the sentence that appears to be pronounced upon us be not irrevocable; if there be yet a possibility of our resisting that power which now aims at erasing the very name of England from the list of independent nations; if the time for exertion be not entirely passed, there is not a moment to be lost in improving the little that remains. Let no man hope, that, because Napoleon is now at the further end of Europe, he will never return; let no man hope, that, if he should be cut off, he will not find a successor. It is *France* that has resolved upon the conquest of England; and, if we are not willing to become the slaves of Frenchmen, we must instantly determine upon, and steadily pursue the means of frustrating that resolution. The continent of Europe is now at the feet of France. There is no reason to suppose that it will stir again for twenty years. This fatal war, into which the allies were precipitated by the councils of Mr. Pitt, has cut off the *chance* of any diversion on that side; and, every man has already concluded, that we shall, alone, have to maintain the contest with the conqueror of the continent.—— Amongst all the mischiefs of the present system, amongst all the causes that tend to our ruin and our subjugation, none is more efficient than the delusion practised upon the people by the influence of a hireling press. From the commencement of the war upon the continent to the present day, the people have never been able to form a correct opinion of the dangers that awaited them. Before the battles began, they were told, that three hundred thousand Austrians and two hundred thousand Russians were actually in the field; they were led to believe that the allies were victorious, they were anxiously waiting for the news of Buonaparté's overthrow, at the very moment that he was conquering the grand army of our friends; and, while the allied army was fleeing through Vienna and that of the Archduke was seeking shelter in the wilds of Croatia, they believed that the French were falling into a snare. They saw, indeed, our nearest and best ally fleeing in haste from his capital; they saw Napoleon in the palace of Maria Theresa; they saw the Emperor of Germany bending his course to find refuge beyond the confines of Germany itself; they saw his provinces, his kingdoms occupied, and their municipal governments organized by the French: yet, they were told to believe, and they did believe, that all was prosperous, and that the enemy was about to be cut off, though backed by army upon army from the banks of the Rhine to those of the Schwartz; and, at last, when the allies had been engaged, when they had been completely defeated, when their armies were half destroyed or captured, and when the two Emperors had bowed themselves down before Buonaparté; even then was this deluded nation induced to believe, that the allies had been completely victorious. The means of deception employed in the course of the campaign can here be spoken of only in general terms; but, those made use of in the last-mentioned instance demand remarks somewhat more in detail. The work of delusion had been theretofore left to the hirelings of the press; but, their falsehoods having so often been detected, the *government* itself interfered; and, on the 17th of December, began its operations by a publication, in the form of a bulletin, of accounts received at the offices. Where are we now to look for the grounds upon which those accounts were given? Where for that defeat of the French right wing, said to be mentioned in Sir Arthur Paget's dispatch? Where for the loss of 27,000 French, on the 2d of December, together with all their artillery? Where for the rejected armistice proposed by Napoleon? Where for those victories, which were gained by the allies on the 3d and 4th, and which were given with such detail, in the government bulletin of the 19th of December, that it seemed to savour of obstinacy not to believe the facts? Where are we now to look for the cause of the enthusiasm of joy at Berlin? Where for the glorious effects of the cheering presence and

animating example of the Emperor Alexander, who rode through the ranks of his army crying "victory or death," and who was answered by acclamations from his troops, that "they never would forsake their Emperor?" And, finally, where are we to look for the agreeable news, contained in the letter to BARON JACOBI, and, for the authenticity of which letter the SUN and COURIER newspapers have declared, that they had AUTHORITY to pledge themselves? And, what are we to think of a government capable of making such publications?—— With a view of preventing detection, the partizans of the ministry have had recourse to accusations and abuse against all those, who have endeavoured to stem the torrent of delusion; accusations the most false and abuse the most foul. They have accused us of wishing for that which we feared; they have charged us with disaffection to our country and its cause; they have called us malcontents and traitors; and, because I gave it as my opinion, that even the glorious victory of Trafalgar would have no material effect with regard to the final result of the war, I was pointed out as an object for public detestation, and for the vengeance of the law.——During the whole of Mr. Pitt's administration, from his first scaling the walls of power to the present day, his partizans have *represented* as traitors all those who disapproved of his measures; but, it was not till of late, that they made use of the term. This term they have recently applied, not only to the public writers opposed to him, but also to those statesmen and legislators, who, from their disapprobation of his conduct and his schemes, are denominated the Opposition. In proportion as the measures of the ministry have been foolish, in that same proportion have been the endeavours to stifle inquiry: to bully, to browbeat, to frown out of countenance; to awe into silence; to terrify by the most cowardly and execrable means. And now, when the hirelings of the press stand at the bar of the public, detected and convicted of the most infamous falsehoods; even now, they have the audacity to repeat their calumnious accusations. "Let those," say they, "who, "from party motives, opposed us upon this "occasion, glory in their triumph, and "*exult in events*, which, however, disastrous to the world, may be considered by "them as confirming their presages and "their reasonings. Our personal disappointment, at the failure of our fond "hopes, is entirely merged in the larger and "more extended affliction we feel at the "unexampled calamity that has befallen "the world. But that our reasoning was, "at least, as just, and our conclusions as "probable, as those with which events have "coincided, is sufficiently evinced by the "*surprise* with which the confirmation of "the adverse intelligence was yesterday re"ceived; and, indeed, many *well-informed* "gentlemen, can even yet hardly bring "themselves to credit the accounts thus "officially published by the government of "France." And thus, they adduce, as a proof of the soundness of their reasoning, the surprise which never would have existed had it not been for the promulgation of their falsehoods. They first, by their hireling means, deceive the people; and, when the deception is dissipated by events, they bring forward the opinions of the people, opinions arising from that deception, in justification of their conduct. But, it is their calumnies; their at once impudent and cowardly calumnies, that the nation is called upon to resent, and that it will resent, if it does not deserve all, and more than all, that the councils of the Pitts and Dundases have brought upon it. "If," say they, "we were sanguine in "hopes, or easy in belief, when victory was "said to have blessed the arms of our allies, "we have, at least, this consolation, that "the impulse that led us astray was *the* "*force of the love of our country*. Those "who were opposite to us in argument and "conclusion were as opposite to us in *hopes*, "in *wishes*, in *motives*, in *interest*. They "wished for *every thing* that could embar"rass the government, and bring ministers "into disgrace, cost what it might to the "country and the world." Base vermin! This, then, is your last shift? Because we augured no good; because, judging from the character and talents of the man, and confirmed in our judgment by long and woeful experience, we anticipated nothing but danger and disgrace from a coalition formed, and a war commenced, at the instigation of Mr. Pitt; and, because, as that war advanced, we discredited the falsehoods, upon which you bade the people build their hopes of success; for this cause, and this alone, it is that you now accuse us of enmity to our country. To what a state, then, is the nation at last reduced? If we disapprove of the measures of a minister, and if those measures prove successful, we are to be regarded as repining at that success, though it may be essential to the safety of the country: if the measures are not successful, if they are followed by all the disasters that we foresee and foretell, then we are to be looked upon as exulting at their failure, though therefrom we may, apparently, date the destruction of

our independence. Here, therefore, is an end to all our liberties, as far as relates to the conduct and measures of the ministry of the day. To disapprove being a mark of disloyalty and disaffection, there is nothing left to us but to approve; and, let it be observed, that, as in principle, so in the practice, this doctrine applies to persons in parliament as well as to those without. Blessed state of freedom! Precious fruit of our "invaluable "constitution!" Irresistible stimulus to exertion, to fight and to shed one's blood! Heart-cheering signal for an on-set: "*death*, "or the *pricilege of applauding Pitt!*"—— If ever there was a time, when every thing, whereby men may be alienated from the government (by which I mean King and parliament and the courts of justice) should be carefully abstained from; if ever there was a time, when the people should see and hear nothing to make them doubt of the *reality* of their liberties, and when the experience of every hour should more and more confirm them in that attachment to these liberties, which alone will, when the day of trial comes, encourage them to act in a manner directly opposite to that of the people of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia; if ever there was such a time, that time now is. What, therefore, are we to think of those, whose constant endeavour it is, or, at least, whose efforts constantly tend, to make us believe, that, in reality, we have no liberties at all? That what we enjoy, we enjoy by mere sufferance from the minister? That, to disapprove of his measures is, to be taken for proof of enmity to our country? That, to have discredited falsehoods, nay, direct lies, issued from the offices in Downing Street, is, even after those lies are detected, to be considered as conclusive evidence of our exulting at the disasters, which those lies were intended to keep from our knowledge? And, finally, that, to crush us, to put us out of all political, and nearly out of all physical, existence, requires only that the minister say the word?——People of England! (for to you I now speak) *Do you* approve of the measures of Mr. Pitt? He has had the management of your affairs for twenty years; he has always been the absolute master of his measures; and, do *you*, I say, approve of them? Do you *approve* of a series of measures, in peace and in war, by which your country has been reduced to its present state? And, are *you* haters of your country? Are you, in addition to all your burdens and your mortifications, to be told that you are traitors? Are you, indeed, because you wish, as you naturally must, for such a change of councillors as would be likely to produce a change of councils, to incur the imputation of enmity to your country and your King?——In England, when the hour of conflict shall come, and come, in all human probability, it speedily will, there will not be found, supposing all hearts united, one man too many. For those, therefore, who would *divide* them, who would mark out as traitors all those who cannot keep silence and who will not applaud the measures of the minister, who reject all support of the country not given conjointly with a support of Mr. Pitt, what appellation can be too harsh, what punishment too severe? To accuse their opponents of a want of loyalty and patriotism is ever the last resource of a baffled ministry; and, sometimes it may succeed; but, in the times that are approaching it will not; for, the course of events, which, forthe last seven years, has been steadily making on towards the point which it has now nearly reached, will be turned aside neither by court-intrigue, by rhetorical dexterity, nor by popular clamour. No tricks like those of the pensioned patriots, who, because the people of Middlesex elected Sir Francis Burdett, cried aloud against the revival of Jacobinism, and called for the speedy resuscitation of the Society against Republicans and Levellers, will now be of any avail, though of that Society it should be proposed to put the tithe-hating and pension-loving Mr. Huskisson at the head. We are, the mere hirelings excepted, all of one mind; thanks to Napoleon, in assuming the purple, we are, as to forms of government, all of one opinion, and that is, that, after all, our own is the best. To preserve it, and with it our liberties, *as handed down to us by our fathers*, we are ready to make every sacrifice that men can make conducive to such an end. But, shall we not be allowed to inquire, whether those sacrifices are likely to be of any avail? Shall we not be permitted to ask, in what hands our resources are to be placed? Shall we be forbidden to examine into the pretensions of those, and of that minister in particular, in whose behalf the hirelings of the press prefer an exclusive claim to the directing of those means, by which alone we can be saved? Ought we not to wish for, and have we not a right to expect, that, *now*, at any rate, our affairs should be committed to men of great statesman-like talents? And, supposing us to possess this right, shall we now, with the London Mayor, think Mr. Pitt "the man "on whom all eyes are fixed, as *the last* "*barrier between Europe and slavery*;" or, shall we, following the dictates of dex-

bought experience, be convinced, that, in his whole life, having wanted nothing in the way of opportunity, he has never given one single proof of possessing such talents, in any matters whether domestic or foreign? ——Let sophisters quibble and hypocrites dissemble as they may, still, in politics, as in religion, the tree will be known by its fruit; and, what is the fruit which this tree of twenty years standing has borne us, our taste, though shockingly corrupted, will easily tell. Various are the opinions of men upon several points as to measures and causes; but, as to effects, we are upon one point, and that the main one, all perfectly agreed; namely, that we are now arrived at the eve of a great crisis; that we are now engaged in a contest for our existence as an independent state; that it is now about to be determined, not whether England shall beat France, or France beat England, but, in the language of Lloyd's, whether Englishmen shall *remain as they are*, or become *the slaves of Frenchmen*. To this question, a question never before mooted, from the times of William the Conqueror to the present day, we have been brought during the administration of WILLIAM PITT; during the administration of that man, whom the London Mayor, to his throng of listening citizens, described as the last remaining barrier between Europe and slavery. If such a question had been put at the beginning of his twenty years administration; if, when, "the perfidious and impious levity of the "multitude" was hailing him as one descended immediately from heaven; if, when he took the reins of a yet powerful kingdom, under every circumstance of advantage, not forgetting that of the decrepitude of France; if, at that time, such a question had been put, what indignation, what disdain, would it not have excited? Let us not be told of his increase of imports and exports; against the gains of the cotton-spinning nobles and those of the nabobs, we could place the more than doubling of the parish paupers. But, we are not to hear of any thing under the name of national prosperity unconnected with our relative situation with regard to France. The first concern of a nation, that, before which all others ought to give way, and, compared with which, sink into nothingness, is, to preserve its independence; and, of course, the first duty of a minister is, so to conduct the affairs of a nation as to enable it to meet its enemies, or, at least, not to suffer it to sink in this respect after it comes into his hands. Answer us not, Lord Castlereagh, with your long list of ships and volunteer-battalions: we know well, that they are numerous enough; but, still, read as long as you will, the question, the ominous and disgraceful question returns: whether Englishmen shall *remain as they are*, or become the *slaves of Frenchmen*; a question, I repeat it, that never, since the days of the Norman; never, through all the vicissitudes of our country, was mooted till the administration of William Pitt. The last poor shift, is, that he has been minister in more difficult times than were ever before known. Difficult times! *He*, indeed, has *lately* said so; and has thrown the blame upon Providence, who, says he, "has *cast our* "*lot* in times of peril." But, to say nothing, just yet, of the great convenience of a come-off like this, which of us cannot bring, from his speeches, proofs of his having, twice a year, at least, during the first eighteen years of his administration, declared the country to be in a prouder situation than she ever before stood; and, of his having dealt his sarcasms about upon all those, who expressed their fears for the ultimate safety of the country? The first eight years of his sway was a time of peace and of plentiful harvests. Every circumstance favoured him; and, when he, at last, resolved on war, circumstances there were not less so. Every year did he boast of the proud situation of England, which he failed not to compare with the exhausted, the miserable, the deplorable, the degraded state of France; every year did he promise us, that the enemy was upon the point of ruin; and, only two years before he counselled and defended the peace of Amiens, he pledged himself to the country, having just then discovered a new and solid system of finance, that he would never make peace without securing the balance of power in Europe. And, at the end of all those boastings, out he comes with his whinings about Providence! Out he comes with a canting gypsey-like story about the casting of our lot! So, Captain Bobadil, when, after all his bragging, he is getting up from beneath a cudgelling, exclaims, "I was certainly *pla-* "*net-struck*;" but, his friend, who has been a witness of the scene, very gravely assures him, that he had been struck with *nothing but a stick*. "It was a stick, in- "deed, Captain, for I saw it with my own "eyes." A similar reply may be made to our hero, who is an officer of higher rank than Bobadil, and who, we know, has studied the art of war with a degree of eagerness, that, at one time, led some folks to fear, that he really would have taken the command, if the French had landed. Providence! No, no! It is "not in his

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Difficult times! *He*, indeed, has *lately* said so; and has thrown the blame upon Providence, who, says he, "has *cast our* "*lot* in times of peril." But, to say nothing, just yet, of the great convenience of a come-off like this, which of us cannot bring, from his speeches, proofs of his having, twice a year, at least, during the first eighteen years of his administration, declared the country to be in a prouder situation than she ever before stood; and, of his having dealt his sarcasms about upon all those, who expressed their fears for the ultimate safety of the country? The first eight years of his sway was a time of peace and of plentiful harvests. Every circumstance favoured him; and, when he, at last, resolved on war, circumstances there were not less so. Every year did he boast of the proud situation of England, which he failed not to compare with the exhausted, the miserable, the deplorable, the degraded state of France; every year did he promise us, that the enemy was upon the point of ruin; and, only two years before he counselled and defended the peace of Amiens, he pledged himself to the country, having just then discovered a new and solid system of finance, that he would never make peace without securing the balance of power in Europe. And, at the end of all those boastings, out he comes with his whinings about Providence! Out he comes with a canting gypsey-like story about the casting of our lot! So, Captain Bobadil, when, after all his bragging, he is getting up from beneath a cudgeling, exclaims, "I was certainly *pla-* "*net-struck*;" but, his friend, who has been a witness of the scene, very gravely assures him, that he had been struck with *nothing but a stick*. "It was a stick, in-"deed, Captain, for I saw it with my own "eyes." A similar reply may be made to our hero, who is an officer of higher rank than Bobadil, and who, we know, has studied the art of war with a degree of eagerness, that, at one time, led some folks to fear, that he really would have taken the command, if the French had landed. Providence! No, no! It is "not in his

" stars, but in himself, that he is an under-
ling. " The French are but men, and they have been the same ever since England was England; and, if they have employed new means, either in the cabinet or in the field, it was for the minister of England to keep pace with them. If your adversary, who has been accustomed to fight you with a stick, comes armed with a sword, it is for you to get a sword too, and not to run about crying that he does not fight fair; and, more especially not lay the blame upon Providence. At the onset of this war, Mr. Pitt promised, that he would " stem the torrent of liquid " fire; " that he would " repress the am-" bition and *chastise the insolence*" of Buonaparté; and, in less than a year afterwards, he falls out with Providence, notwithstanding the Morning Post assures us, that we are, and must be, " the particular de-" light of Providence. " What are now become of these boasts? *Has* he stemmed the torrent of liquid fire? Has he, even with the aid of Lord Castlereagh and Lord Mulgrave and Mr. Huskisson and Old Rose, repressed the ambition and chastised the insolence of Buonaparté?——But, if the times were difficult; allowing for argument sake, that they were difficult; did he listen to these who advised him what course to pursue? Never. In the late war, he had, as ha been before observed, a choice between the advice of Mr. Fox and that of Mr. Burke; he chose to follow neither; and he and Lord Melville pursued, without suffering themselves to be interrupted, the course which ended in the peace of Amiens. That he was not sparing either in money or men, we very well know. In fact, he took where and what he chose, the doctrine of the day being, that whatever men had left was so much saved out of the fire of revolution. Never was there in the world an instance of a minister's having a nation so completely at his nod! And, after all this, does he talk of difficult times?——In the case of the present war upon the continent, the advice he received, the solemn warning he received, is still fresh in our memory. It is now only six months and fourteen days ago, that Mr. Fox besought the House of Commons to grant him no money for the purpose of stirring up Austria to war. This warning we must now re-peruse; we must keep it constantly before us; it is an unerring guide in forming an opinion of the two men. Mr. Fox, observe, had not, as the base hirelings of the press have insinuated, any objection to repressing the ambition of France; he had no objection to a combination of powers upon the continent for that purpose; but, he objected to a premature effort for urging those powers into a war, and that for the reasons which he so distinctly and so prophetically gave. When the House again meets, he has nothing to do but to read his speech of the 21st of June, and then, with the event before them, to leave them to judge between him and the man who has had the presumption to be his *rival*. He said: " After what had passed, it was a " matter of less delicacy to express an opi-" nion on hypothesis, as to the purpose for " which the vote was called for; whether " on the hypothesis, that it was to enable " us to make terms of peace, or on the hy-" pothesis that it was to engage the powers " of the continent to co-operate with us in " the war. On this head he should state " briefly his opinion. It seemed to be the " prevailing opinion, that to engage with " Russia alone would make our situation " more difficult than at present, unless " Prussia or Austria could be included in " the confederacy: of the first of these " powers co-operating there was less hope, " of the latter more, though he thought " fear a more proper term than hope in the " latter case. Without a sure prospect of " efficient co-operation, he should feel " most unhappy if he were to suffer this " vote to pass without entering his protest " against it, without warning this country " and Europe against the consequences. No " man could tell what would be the issue of " war; but when they looked to the past, " he asked, with what rational hope such a " war as the late one could be begun, and " with what rational ground of success? " Was it intended that, at the present pe-" riod of the year, when Austria was un-" prepared, any operations should be un-" dertaken, or only that every thing should " be prepared to begin the war in the next " campaign? If Austria were to move, " and the consequence should be, what " was not improbable, productive of serious " disasters, what would become of our " hopes of continental connexions? what " of the liberties of Europe? what of the " prospect of setting limits to the power " of France, justly and rationally consider-" ed already too formidable? Under such " circumstances, and on such information, " it became wise men to consider well be-" fore they should grant any money where " the chances were one hundred to one a-" gainst success. But it was the manner in " which the matter was proposed that " weighed with him. If we had remain-" ed at peace, as he wished we had, and Au-" stria, Russia, or Prussia, had applied to

" us for assistance in their quarrel, no man " would be more ready than himself to agree " to granting it. But when we had dashed " singly into the war, and, as had been ar- " gued the preceding night, for the pur- " pose of rousing the powers of Europe by " our example, which we could only exhi- " bit in the case of invasion, that put the " question on a different footing. He dis- " liked the phrase to rouse Europe, because " the attempt to do so had the effect " of producing a disinclination to co-operate " with us. Every man knew that the charac- " ter of the British government in Europe " was, that it was actuated by selfish motives " in instigating the powers of the continent " to war for British interests. He hoped " that this opinion was false; but if we " should attempt to instigate the powers of " the continent to a renewal of hostilities, " whilst they wished to remain at peace, " whether for the purpose of regaining " strength or recruiting their resources, " or for whatever other reason, it would a- " lienate the affections of Europe more from " us than any inefficiency that could take " place in the conduct of the war. If Au- " stria alone were to embark with us in the " war, she could not use her exertions with " advantage to herself or to us. The in- " terests of both would be identified, could " not be separated, and consequently nei- " ther could enjoy the full benefits of her " exertions. This was a ground for think- " ing that the result could not be favorable. " Austria would be driven to the alternative " of concluding a treaty under the same " circumstances which obliged her to con- " clude the treaty of Leoben and Luneville, " and to submit to such terms as France " should dictate; for it was contrary to all " experience and history to suppose, as had " been argued, that being engaged to Rus- " sia and England, she would be bound to " hold out to the last. No country could " be obliged by any treaty to hold out to its " destruction and lie down under its ruin. " There was another alternative which " Austia might adopt, which was, to hold " out to the end; and might not that con- " duct endanger the total extinction of the " second power in Europe? If she chose, " as he thought she would, the former al- " ternative, we should then be driven, after " all our efforts and expence, either to make " a separate peace, or to carry on a defen- " sive war. He hoped we should not be " reduced to that alternative, and should not " discuss what should be our conduct in such " a case. It would be highly indiscreet in " us to form an alliance for the purpose of a " continental war with Russia and Austria, " and it would be still more indiscreet in " Austria, for Russia and Great-Britain " would be in a far different situation from " that of their ally. If such an alliance " could be formed with Russia, Austria, " Prussia, and the other powers of the " continent, as would gain their good will, " without attempting to rouse them before " their own interest, in their own view of " them, would call for their exertions, such " an alliance would afford hopes that we " might obtain reasonable terms of peace." Upon this Mr. Pitt, with that sort of candour for which he is so famous, observed, that Mr. Fox's observations "seemed to go " this length, that all attempts at releasing " ourselves from our present situation were " improper, because it might happen that " our affairs might be made worse. This " was a mode of reasoning that would lead " all the powers of the continent to remain " supine under the oppression of France, " and never attempt to oppose her schemes " of ambition and aggrandizement. Why? " because in opposing these schemes, they " ran a risk of making matters worse. But " were they to wait till the power of France " was much more increased, and much " more confirmed? till their own resources " were much more reduced than they were " at present, and till the power of resis- " tance was gone? This would indeed be " exposing themselves to a certainty of " having theirs made worse."——Upon this the benches at his back rang with *hear! hear!* Dearly as the nation has heretofore paid for the cheering from that quarter, this last cheering will be, by far, the dearest! Mr. Fox replied, " that, as far " as he was informed of the state of Eu- " rope, he believed, that, if Austria should " be allured to engage in a war with France, " she would expose herself to the most ex- " treme peril, to a danger far beyond any " chance of advantage." He had never said, nor did his words convey any such implication, that we never were to attempt any thing for fear of rendering our situation worse by the attempt. He never said, that we ought to *risk nothing*. But he said, that in urging Austria into the war, we were risking too much; and this opinion was founded upon reasons that he gave. To risk, even greatly to risk, may, in some cases, be the height of prudence; but, it is for the wise man to determine when to risk; and, it now appears, that as Mr. Fox said, the risk was all on one side.——With this parliamentary debate before them, for Mr. Pitt's partizans to tell us, that his measures

were well-planned, that he acted for the best, that to hope for success was rational, is impudence not to be borne. If you see a man upon the verge of a precipice, if you tell him that another step will bring him to the bottom, if he takes the step and falls, has any one the assurance to tell you that he was as right as you? That he ought not to have believed you, and that he is not to be blamed for his obstinacy? If, indeed, you see a measure about to be adopted, and say nothing about it till the event be known, you have no right to find fault with it afterwards; but, here the measure was objected to; it was protested against, and the reasons, whereon that protest was founded, were given. What is it that distinguishes wise men from fools? What but those powers of the mind which enable them to perceive that which fools cannot perceive? And, when they are at issue upon a matter of opinion, what is to decide, but the *event*. Besides, when the partizans of the minister tell us, that their conclusions, that is to say, the conclusions of Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville, were as probable as the conclusions of Mr. Fox, and of us who thought with him upon the subject of the present, or, rather, the *late*, coalition; when they talk of these conclusions, they, as is their invariable custom, overlook the premises. If, as they asserted, there had been 180,000 Russians, actually upon their march in the month of September, and if there had been an army of 300,000 Austrians, well disciplined and appointed, in the field at that time; if the Elector of Bavaria had joined his troops to those of Austria; if the kingdom of Hungary had poured into the hands of the Emperor more money and had raised him more men than he knew what to do with; and, finally, if Prussia had, in the month of September, or October, joined the coalition with her army of 300,000 men; if all this had been *true*, then, indeed, the conclusions of Mr. Pitt and the hirelings would have been not only as probable as ours, but much more probable than ours. But, they were false, the premises were all false; our opponents built upon sand, upon a shadow, and the consequence has been that which, in such case, necessarily must be. It is not as to conclusions that we have differed from them; it is upon points of *fact* that, in every stage of the war, we have been at variance. Mr. Pitt assumed, that the powers, with whom he was about to coalesce stood in need of nothing but British gold to enable them to face Napoleon, and to turn the tide of his fortune; Mr. Fox denied this: he [illegible] stood in need of more, and that, if they accepted of that gold, particularly before they were well prepared, they would fail, and that then our situation, to say nothing of the loss of our money, would be infinitely worse than it was before. In every stage of the war, have the hirelings assumed certain premises: they have promulgated, as truths not to be questioned, a certain set of correspondent falsehoods. Upon these they have reasoned; from these they have drawn conclusions: and, of course, these conclusions have been false. It is not of incorrect reasoning that we accuse them; it is not of an error of judgment; but, of wilful falsehood, of criminal falsehood, of falsehood promulgated for the purposes of deception, of lies of the most mischievous tendency. They now tell their deluded hearers, that "if the means were "not proportionate to the object to be ac-"complished, it is more matter of *sorrow* "than of blame." But, they told us, and they abused us for doubting their assertions, that the means were fully proportionate to the object. They told us, that Napoleon was taken by surprize; that the Austrians had got the start of him; that the Russian armies were following each other through the Austrian dominions; and, finally, that this wonderful promptitude was entirely to be ascribed to "the all-commanding genius of "Mr. Pitt." Far, they say now, from blaming the minister for endeavouring to bring about "a coalition *capable of setting* "*bounds to the ambition of Buonaparté*, "we regard it as a highly meritorious in-"stance of his exertions for the preserva-"tion of this country and the general deli-"verance." But, they were told, that *this* coalition was not capable of doing it; they were told that its materials were crude, its foundation unstable, and that the time and manner of it were not calculated to produce success. They were told so, and with what calumnies have they repaid their admonishers! What term, expressive of ignorance, of wilfulness, of baseness and of treachery have they not applied to all those who endeavoured, though in vain, to guard the deluded people against their deceptions! "To us," say they, "it ap-"pears that the moment was come," and they quote the words of Demosthenes, after the battle of Chœronea, so fatal to the liberties of Greece. "I could not foresee, "that the event would have been as it has "turned out, but if any divine revelation "had presented it to me in all its horrors, "I would, I ought, still to have acted as "I have done." Will Mr. Pitt avail himself of this hint? Will he make a declara-

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tion like this? When destruction is the obviously certain effect of inaction, then, indeed, such a defence may be made; because, action affords a chance, at least, of deliverance. But, who will say? What honest man has been so far deluded; or, what hireling has been so highly bribed, as to assert, that this was the case with respect to Austria and Prussia? Who, on the contrary, does not perceive, that, if the coalition had not been so soon formed, and so hastily driven into action, that Napoleon could not have made any further encroachments of importance without great disadvantage to his cause; without drawing the powers together by natural ties? Who does not see, that he would have lost strength by every further aggression? And, who does not see, that, if the English parliament had withheld the means of *precipitating* Austria into the war, the battle of Austerlitz would never have been fought, and that Austria would still have been a great power, would still have been an object towards which England might have looked with hope? It is not the principle of continental coalitions that we have ever condemned. Without such a coalition there was no hope of obtaining honourable terms of peace, at least, in any reasonable length of time. But, because it is good to rise, and even to rise early, is it, therefore, good to rise at any time, to rise at midnight, in the dark, and to grope our way about? We were in a situation when it became us to act with caution; to take time; so to lay the foundation of our measures as for them not to be easily shaken. But, though we could have waited, the minister could not. *His* affairs demanded, imperiously demanded, dispatch. The season was advanced; the Russians in Siberia, or God knows where; the Austrians unprepared; but, parliament was again to meet in December or January. Something was wanted, absolutely wanted, and something, therefore, was to be done. With what exultation, with what unmeasured insolence of triumph, did the hirelings of the press hail the first movement of the Austrians! In their anticipation of the effect in parliament, they seemed entirely to overlook the consequences upon the continent. At the prospect of seeing (I use their own words) "the attention of "the House of Commons *turned from the* "*little nonsense* about naval inquiries and "Tenth Reports to the mighty concerns "connected with the deliverance of Eu"rope," their joy was unbounded! What the great object of Mr. Pitt might be we cannot exactly know; but, we do know, that, from the moment the Austrians made the first step in that war, which, in the space of two months, has laid their unfortunate and misguided Sovereign at the feet of his and our enemy; from that moment did the hirelings, whom we have recently seen maintaining the truth of the two bulletins, begin to hold a language, calculated to convince every one, that *they*, at least, looked forward to the effect which the campaign on the continent would produce upon the divisions in parliament; and, as upon the occasion of the loss of the first Austrian army, we now see them deeply engaged in the task of proving, that Mr. Pitt was not to blame, and that, on account of the frustration of his schemes and the terrible disasters arising from a war of his fomenting, he ought *to lose no votes in parliament!* Such then was, and now is, the consolation which they tender to their country and to the Emperor of Austria! The *motive* of the minister himself we cannot precisely ascertain; but, that it was he who *precipitated* the House of Austria into the war can no longer be denied. It is a fact established, not by evidence such as that, whereon the Two Bulletins were issued; not by hearsay and rumour; not by what has been said to have been said by an Estafette or a king's messenger; but, by the concurrent testimony of official documents; by the intercepted letter of Lord Harrowby (the authenticity of which has never, even yet, been denied), the report of the Archduke Charles of the cause of his retreat; and, lastly, by the declaration of the Emperor of Austria himself, as recorded in the French bulletins. This declaration, is, we are told, fabricated; but, people of England, deceived, duped people of England! I beseech you to remember, that this is told us by those, who have constantly denied the truth of those fate-bearing bulletins; by those, who told you, that the French were defeated at Kerms; by those who told you that the Archduke was falling upon the rear of Napoleon with 90,000 men; by those who told you, that 150,000 Prussians were first upon their march into Franconia, but had made a short turn to the left, and were, by forced marches, going through Bohemia to attack the French in Moravia; by those who told you of the famous royal swearing at Potsdam; by those who told you that the Emperor Napoleon and his army were drowned in the Danube; by those, who, in winding up the climax of atrocious impositions, gave you, in the form of authentic documents, assurances, that, on the 3d and 4th of December, the Emperor of Russia, after having performed feats of valour more than mortal, had completely

defeated the French, captured 40,000 prisoners and all the artillery of the enemy. From the pens of these identical persons, observe, it is, that you *now* are to learn, that the declaration of the Emperor of Austria is a fabrication; it is the words of these persons, who declared the Russian proposition to capitulate, to be a forgery; who asserted to be a forgery the letter of Count Palfy to Marshal Davoust, stipulating for the neutrality of Hungary; who stigmatized as a forgery the proclamation received by M. Bourienne, and who marked out as traitors all those who believed in its authenticity; and, who, to the very last hour, asserted, that the Argus, though it contained the official details of the battle of Austerlitz, was an infamous fabrication for stock-jobbing purposes: it is the word, the bare word of these very persons, that you are now called upon to believe, in direct contradiction to the statements of those bulletins, which have uniformly proved so minutely and so fatally true! No, no! It is not a fabrication: it is authentic; and it comes, with force irresistible, to confirm the opinion, that Austria had, by English councils, been *precipitated to her ruin*. And, shall not those councils be changed? Shall they still be supported? Shall we still see the representatives of the people voting our money, by millions upon millions, into the hands of the man who has therewith purchased the battle of Austerlitz?—"But the king; the *will* of the king!" Base, false, slavish insinuation! As if His Majesty could wish that which tends, that which has constantly tended, to the subjugation of his people, and, of course, to the subversion of his throne, and the throne of his children! The king's *will!* then, indeed, it were time to cease talking of the constitution of England! The king, no one denies it, has an uncontrolable right to appoint his servants; but, shall our representatives, for fear of thwarting the wishes, or disturbing the arrangements or pleasures of the king, not refuse to commit the resources of the nation to the hands of those servants? It is our duty, a duty enjoined by religion as well as by honour, to lay down our lives, if necessary, for the defence of the person and dignity of the king; but, that we live not under a despotism consists entirely in the power which the parliament has of refusing to grant money to his servants; and, if that power be given up, whatever be the motive for which the surrender is made, whether of love or of fear, then are we, though not nominally, really under a despotism. But, in behalf of our sovereign as well as ourselves, it behoves us to reject, with disdain, these insinuations, the last resource of discomfited baseness. His Majesty, who must be fully sensible of the awfulness of the danger with which we are now menaced, waits, doubtless, to hear the voice of his people, or, at least, of those amongst them, qualified by their talents and their information to afford him advice. And shall we, like the wretches suffocating in the Black-hole of Calcutta, be told that his repose is not to be disturbed? I trust, that with such an answer we shall not be satisfied; but, that, in *all the ways* pointed out by the constitution, we shall approach his throne with an expression of our desire to be saved, and, with a hope, that he will, as far as lies with him, afford us the means; with a settled resolution to sacrifice our all, if necessary, in defence of our liberties and of his person and family; but, with a confident expression of our wish and our expectation, that he will change those councils, by which the enormous sacrifices we have hitherto made have been rendered of no avail. I trust, that we shall not regard ourselves as intruders; that, while, with affectionate attachment, we own his sway, while we know the crown of England to be his, we feel that England is *our* country; that we have, down to the meanest man amongst us, a deep interest in all that honour and renown, in those liberties and that happiness, which are now brought into jeopardy, and that, upon the immutable principles of justice, as well as from usage and from law, we have a *right* to be heard.

The following Preface to the 8th volume of the Register must supply the place of what I intended to have inserted, according to annual custom, at the head of this volume.

PREFACE.

In closing this volume, I think it proper, considering the great interest which we must all, at this time, necessarily feel as to the transactions between nation and nation, to point out the utility of this work, as a Register of those transactions. One of the principal objects of the undertaking, was, to insure to my readers the possession of *all* the authentic documents, which should, during the continuance of the work, appear in print, relative to transactions between nation and nation; and, so unremitted has been my attention thereunto, that, I think I may safely assert, that no document of that description has been omitted; an assertion, which, I am persuaded, cannot, with truth, be made in favour of any other work extant. In every other work, professing to be a Register of the times, the compilers

have, for some reason or other, contented themselves with a *selection* of documents. For most present purposes this may be sufficient; but, every selection must depend upon the taste, or the opinion, of the person selecting; and, from one cause or another, it must produce a representation, which, in a greater or less degree, is deficient in point of impartiality, though, perhaps, contrary to the wishes of the compiler. The great source of error as to transactions of pass times is the want of a collection of *all* the documents relating to them. This must have been perceived by every reader of history. For the want of such a collection, what great and mischievous errors have descended to the present day! To what acrimonious and disgraceful disputes; to what doubts, what distrust, what unsettled notions, and to what inconsistency of action has this deficiency of record given rise! To prevent those evils, as far as may relate to the times of which this work will be a Register, has been an object of which I have never lost sight. In the opinions and the statement of my own, I am not inclined to deny that prejudice and passion have frequently had their influence; but, in giving *all* the authentic documents, I have done my best to guard future times, at least (if my work should happen to outlive its author) against the effect of such influence.—The same motive has been my guide in collecting and recording the documents relating to the internal concerns of foreign nations, as well as those relating to the internal concerns of our own country; and, I fear not to repeat, that, under the three heads; First, of PUBLIC PAPERS; Second, of FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS; and, Third, of DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS, the Political Register contains a collection such as is to be found in no other work. The total number of these documents, contained in the Eight Volumes, must astonish any one not accustomed to much observation upon the subject, there being of the first class 764; of the second, 825; and of the third, 680, making, in the whole, 2269; all arranged in the chronological order of their first appearance in England, that being the order of all others best calculated to further every object of research, especially as each volume is furnished with Indexes as well as with Tables of Contents made out under an experimental conviction of their utility.——It may be useful to observe, that, since the commencement of the PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES, as a separate work, the documents, of whatever description, *officially laid before Parliament*, have been recorded there; and, as to the Debates themselves, which must be considered as amongst the first of materials for history, I risk no contradiction in saying, that they are, (to say nothing of the MINUTES, which connect them with one another and which must always render the whole perfectly intelligible at the first glance) recorded with a degree of copiousness and of accuracy, hitherto unknown in similar compilations.——Indulging, as I long have, and as I yet do, the hope of being, for a few years, at least, now and then remembered as one of those, whom the spirit-stirring circumstances of these awful times have drawn forth from their native obscurity, I have never ceased anxiously to desire, that the events, amidst which I have lived, and in which I have taken so deep an interest, may be handed down to posterity undisfigured by falsehood. Actuated by this desire, I have bent my mind on securing of a faithful record of those events; and, if popular delusion and popular baseness, fed by the corruptions of the commercial system, should continue to triumph till the very names of liberty and of honour shall be expunged from the English language, and till every man shall be brought to lend his hand to the muzzling of his neighbour, I shall still have the satisfaction to reflect, that, on my part, no effort has been wanting to prevent this consummation of national infamy.

The number of sheets in the present volume is *thirty-three*. Each of the three preceding volumes contain the same number; and, this is, indeed, the fixed bulk of the volumes, the *annual* cost being, of course, 2*l.* 16*s.*

As the early volumes of the Register have been reprinted, *complete Sets* may be had by applying to R. Bagshaw, No. 31, Bow-Street, or J. Budd, No. 100, Pall-Mall; to whom all orders should be addressed.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 28th Dec. 1805.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

CONTINENTAL WAR.——*(Continued from p. 962.)—Thirtieth Bulletin of the Grand French Army.*

Austerlitz, Dec. 3.—On she 27th ult. the Emperor, upon receiving the communication of the full powers of M. M. Stadion and De Guilay, offered previously an armistice, in order to spare the effusion of blood, if any real intention were entertained of coming to an arrangement and a definitive accommodation.——But it was easy for the Emperor to perceive that they had other projects; and as the hope of success could only be derived from the side of the Rus-

sian army, he easily conjectured that the 2d and 3d armies were arrived, or were on the point of arriving, at Olmutz, and that the negotiations were only a *russe de guerre*, to lull his vigilance to sleep.—On the 28th, at 9 in the morning, a cloud of Cossacks, supported by Russian cavalry, made Prince Murat's advanced posts fall back, surrounded Wischau, and took 50 of the 6th regiment of dragoons. In the course of the day the Emperor of Russia repaired to Wischau, and the whole of the Russian army took up a position behind that city —The Emperor sent his aid-de-camp, General Savary, to compliment the Emperor of Russia, as soon as he knew of the arrival of that Prince in the army. General Savary returned at the moment the Emperor was reconnoitering the fires of the enemy's out-posts at Wischau. He spoke in warm terms of commendation of the handsome reception, the favours, and the personal sentiments, of the Emperor of Russia, and even of the Grand Duke Constantine, who shewed him every attention; but it was easy to understand, from the conversation he had for three days, with some 30 coxcombs, who, under different titles, are about the Emperor of Russia, that presumption, inconsiderateness, and imprudence, reigned in the decisions of the military cabinet, as much as they had reigned in those of the political cabinet.—An army so conducted, could not but commit faults; the Emperor's plan was, from that moment, to wait for them, and to watch the moment for profiting by them. He immediately ordered his army to retreat in the night, as if he had been defeated, took a good position, 3 leagues in the rear, and laboured, with much ostentation, at fortifying it, and raising batteries.—He proposed an interview to the Emperor of Russia, who sent him his aid de-camp. Prince Dolgorucki; that officer might remark, that every thing breathed reserve and fear in the appearance of the French army. The placing the strong guards, the fortifications made with such haste; every thing shewed to the Russian officer, an army half beaten.—Contrary to the Emperor's custom, who never receives with so much circumspection the flags of truce at his head-quarters, he went himself to the advanced posts. The Russian discussed every thing, with an impertinence, difficult to be conceived; he was in the most perfect ignorance of the interests of Europe, and of the situation of the Continent. In a word, he was a young trumpeter for England. He spoke to the Emperor, as he speaks to the Russian officers, whom he has long disgusted by his haughtiness and improper conduct. The Emperor repressed his indignation, and the young man, who has a real influence over the Emperor Alexander, returned with a conviction that the French army was on the eve of ruin. One may be convinced, above all, of what the Emperor must have suffered, when it is known, that, towards the close of the conversation, he proposed to him to cede Belgium, and to place the Iron Crown upon the head of the most implacable enemies of France. All these different steps are attended with their due effect. The young heads that direct the Russian affairs gave themselves up, without measure, to their natural presumption. It was no longer, whether the French army shall be beaten? But, whether it shall be turned and taken? It had only done so much through the cowardice of the Austrians. We are assured that several old Austrian generals, who had made campaigns against the Emperor, warned the council, that it was not with that confidence that one ought to march against old soldiers, and officers of the first merit. They said, they had seen the Emperor reduced to a handful of men, re-possess himself of victory, under the most difficult circumstances, by rapid and unforeseen operations, and destroy the most numerous armies; that here no advantage had been obtained; that, on the contrary, all the affairs with the rear-guard of the first Russian army had been in favour of the French army; but, to that the presumptuous young men opposed the bravery of the 80,000 Russians, the enthusiasm inspired by the presence of their Emperor, the picked corps of the imperial guard of Russia, and, what probably they dared not say, their talents, of which they were astonished the Austrians would not acknowledge the power.—On the 1st of Dec., the Emperor, from the heights, saw, with indescribable joy, the Russian army beginning, within twice the distance of cannon-shot from his advanced posts, a flank movement to turn his right. He perceived then to what a pitch presumption and ignorance of the art of war had misled the councils of that brave army. He said, several times, "Before to-morrow night, that army shall be in my power." Yet the enemy's idea was far different; they appeared before our posts within pistol shot; they defiled by a flank march upon a line four leagues long. In passing the length of the French army, which seemed not to dare to quit its position, they had but one fear, that the French army should escape. Every thing was done to confirm the enemy in this idea. Prince Murat sent out a small corps on the plain; but all at once it seemed asto-

nished at the immense force of the enemy, and returned in haste. Hence every thing tended to confirm the Russian general in the miscalculated operation which he had determined upon. The Emperor put the annexed proclamation in the order of the day. At night, he wished to visit on foot, and incognito, all the posts; but he had not gone many steps when he was recognized. It would be impossible to depict the enthusiasm of the soldiers upon seeing him. Lighted straw was placed in an instant upon the tops of thousands of poles, and 80,000 men appeared before the Emperor, saluting him with acclamations: some to celebrate the anniversary of his coronation, others saying, that the army would to-morrow offer its *bouquet* to the Emperor. One of the oldest grenadiers went up to him, and said, "Sire, you need not expose yourself; I promise you, in the name of the grenadiers of the army, that you shall only have to fight with your eyes, and that we will bring you to-morrow the colours and artillery of the Russian army to celebrate the anniversary of your coronation."—The Emperor said, upon his return to his guard-house, which consisted of a miserable straw cabin, without a roof, which the grenadiers had made for him, "This is the finest evening of my life; but I regret to think that I shall lose a good number of these brave fellows. I feel, by the pain it gives me, that they are indeed my children, and I often reproach myself for this sentiment, for I fear it will terminate in rendering me unfit to carry on war." If the enemy had seen the sight, it would have terrified them; but the unthinking enemy continued their movements, and hastened, with quick steps, to their ruin.—The Emperor made his dispositions for battle immediately. He sent off Marshal Davoust, in great haste, to the Convent of Raygern: he was, with one of his divisions, and a division of dragoons, to keep in check the enemy's left wing, in order that, upon a given signal, it might be quite surrounded.——He gave to Marshal Lannes the command of the left wing; to Marshal Soult the command of the right; and to Marshal Bernadotte the command of the centre. Prince Murat received the command of the cavalry, with which he was posted on one point. The left of Marshal Lannes approached Santon, a superb position, which had been fortified and mounted with eighteen pieces of cannon. From the preceding evening, he had entrusted the keeping of that firm position to the 17th light infantry, and certainly it could not be guarded by better troops. General Suchet's division formed the left of Marshal Lannes; the division of General Cafarelli formed his right, and was supported, at the same time, by Prince Murat's cavalry. The latter had before it the hussars and chasseurs under General Thellemon, and the dragoon divisions of Walther and Beaumont, and, in reserve, the cuirassier division of Generals Nansouty and Hautpoult, with 24 pieces of light artillery.—Marshal Bernadotte, that is to say the centre, had, on the left, the division of General Rivaud, which also communicated with Prince Murat's right wing, and, on the right, the division of General Drouet.—Marshal Soult, who commanded the right wing of the army, had, on his left, the division of General Van Damme; in his centre, the division of General St. Hilaire; and, on his right, the division of General Legrand.——Marshal Davoust was detached to the right of General Legrand, to observe the road between the lakes, and the villages of Sokolnitz and Celnitz. He had with him General Friant's division, and the dragoons of General Bouchier's division. The division of General Gudin was directed to march at day-break from Nicolsburg, to stop the corps of the enemy which might have outflanked the right wing.—The Emperor, with his faithful companion in war, Marshal Berthier, his first aid-de-camp, Colonel Junot, and all his état-major, were in reserve, with the ten battalions of his guard, and the ten battalions of General Oudinot's grenadiers, part of whom were commanded by General Duroc.—This reserve, ranged in two lines, in columns by battalion, deployed at a distance, having in the intervals 40 pieces of cannon, served by the cannoniers of the guard. It was with this reserve, that the Emperor intended to push forward wherever it would have been necessary; we may say this reserve was worth an army.—At one in the morning, the Emperor got on horseback to visit the posts, reconnoitre the fires of the enemy, and get an account of what the guards had learned of the movements of the Russians. He heard that they had passed the night in drunkenness and noise, and that a corps of Russian infantry had appeared in the village of Sokolnitz, occupied by a regiment of the division under General Legrand, who had orders to reinforce it.——Day dawned at length on the second; the sun rose bright; and the anniversary of the coronation of the Emperor, upon which one of the greatest feats in arms of the age was to be performed, was one of the finest days in autumn.—This battle, which the soldiers persist in calling the day of the Three Emperors, which others call the day of the An-

niversary, and which the Emperor named the Battle of Austerlitz, will be ever memorable in the annals of the great nation.—— The Emperor, surrounded by all the marshals, waited only for the horizon to clear up, to issue his last orders. When the sun shot forth his first rays, the orders were issued, and each marshal joined his corps, full gallop.—The Emperor said, in passing along the front of several regiments: "Soldiers, we must finish this campaign by a thunderbolt, which shall confound the pride of our enemies:" and instantly hats were placed at the point of bayonets, and cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were the signal for battle. A moment afterwards, the cannonade began at the extremity of the right, which the enemy's advanced guard had already outflanked, but the unexpected meeting with Marshal Davoust, stopped the enemy short, and the battle began.—Marshal Soult put himself in motion at the same moment, proceeded to the heights of the village of Pratzen, with Generals Vandamme and St. Hilaire's division, and cut off the enemy's right, whose movements became uncertain. Surprised by a flank march, whilst it was flying, believing itself to be attacking, and seeing itself attacked, it considered itself has half defeated. —Prince Murat was in motion with his cavalry. The left wing, under the command of General Lannes, marched forward also, *en echelons*, by regiments, in the same manner, as if they had been exercising by divisions. A tremendous cannonade took place along the whole line: 203 pieces of cannon, and nearly 200,000 men, made a dreadful noise. It was really a giant combat. Not an hour had elapsed, and the enemy's whole left was cut off; their right had already reached Austerlitz, the head-quarters of the two Emperors, who marched immediately to the Emperor of Russia's guard, to endeavour to restore the communication of the centre with the left. A battalion of the 4th of the line was charged by the imperial Russian guard, on horseback, and routed; but the Emperor was at hand; he perceived this movement; ordered Marshal Bassieres to go to the succour of his right, with his invincibles, and the two guards were soon engaged. —Success could not be doubtful, in a moment the Russian guard was routed; colonel, artillery, standards, every thing was taken. The regiment of the Grand Duke Constantine was annihilated. He owed his safety only to the swiftness of his horse.— From the heights of Austerlitz the two Emperors beheld the defeat of all the Russian guard. At the same moment, the centre of the army, commanded by Marshal Bernadotte, advanced; three of his regiments made a very fine charge of cavalry. The left, commanded by Marshal Lannes, made several. All the charges were victorious. General Caffarelli's division distinguished itself. The cuirassier division took the enemy's batteries. At one, p. m. the victory was decided; it had not been doubtful for a moment; not a man of the reserve was wanted, and had assisted no where; a cannonade was kept up only on our right. The enemy's corps, which had been surrounded and driven from all the heights, were on a flat, and near a lake. The Emperor hastened thither, with 20 pieces of cannon. This corps was driven from position to position, and we saw the horrid spectacle, such as was seen at Aboukir, of 20,000 men throwing themselves into the water, and drowning themselves in the lake.——Two columns of Russians, 4000 each, laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners. All the enemy's park of artillery is taken. The result of this day is 40 Russian standards, amongst which are the standards of the imperial guard; a considerable number of prisoners; the état-major does not yet know how many; we have already an account of 20,000, 12 or 15 generals; at least 15,000 Russians killed on the field of battle. Though we have not yet the report, we may, at the first *coup-d'œil*, estimate our loss at 800 killed, and 15 or 1600 wounded. This will not surprise military men, who know that it is only in a rout that men are lost; and no other corps, but the battalion of the 4th, was penetrated. Amongst the wounded are, General St. Hilaire, who, wounded at the beginning of the battle, remained the whole day on the field. He covered himself with glory; generals of division, Kellerman and Walther; generals of brigade, Valhabert, Thiebault, Sebastiani, Compar, and Rapp, the Emperor's aid-de-camp. It was the latter who, in charging, at the head of the grenadiers of the guard, took Prince Repnin, captain of the chevaliers of the imperial guard of Russia. With respect to the men who distinguished themselves, it was the whole army that covered itself with glory; it constantly charged to the cry of *Vive l'Empereur*, and the idea of celebrating so gloriously the anniversary of the coronation, animated the soldier.—The French army, though fine and numerous, was less numerous than the enemy's army, which was 105,000 strong; 80,000 Russians, and 25,000 Austrians; the half of this army is destroyed; the rest has been completely routed, and the greater part threw away their arms.—This day will cost tears of

blood at St. Petersburgh. May it cause the gold of England to be rejected with indignation! And may that young prince, whom so many virtues called to be the father of his subjects, tear himself from the influence of those 30 coxcombs, whom England pays, and whose impertinence injures his intentions, makes him lose the love of his soldiers, and hurries him into the most ill-judged operations. Nature, in endowing him with so many great qualites, had meant him to be the consoler of Europe. Perfidious councils, by rendering him the auxiliary of England, will place him, in history, in the rank of men, who, perpetuating the war upon the Continent, will have consolidated the British tyranny upon the seas, and produced the misery of our generation. If France cannot arrive at peace, but upon the conditions proposed by the aid-de-camp, Dolgorucki, to the Emperor, and which M. Novosiltzoff was ordered to make, Russia should not obtain them were her army encamped upon the heights of Montmatre.—In a more detailed relation of this battle, the état-major will make known what each corps, officers and general, have done, to render the French name illustrious, and to afford proof of their love for the Emperor.—On the 3d, at day-break, Prince John of Lichtenstein, commanding the Austrian army, came to the Emperor's head-quarters, in a barn. He had a long audience; yet we pursue our successes. The enemy have retired by the road of Austerlitz to Godding. The French army is already on their rear, and follow them sword in hand —Never was there a more horrible field of battle. From the middle of the immense lakes, we hear still the cries of thousands of men who could not be assisted. Three days must elapse 'ere all the wounded enemy are carried to Brunn. The heart bleeds. May so much bloodshed, may so many miseries fall, at length, upon the perfidious Islanders who are the cause of it! May the cowardly Oligarchs of London bear the burthen of so many evils!

Order of the Day.—On the Field, Dec. 1.

Soldiers, the Russian army is before you, to avenge the Austrian army at Ulm. They are the same battalions you beat at Hollebrun, and which you have constantly pursued. The positions we occupy are formidable; and whilst they march to my right, they shall present me the flank.—Soldiers, I shall direct myself all your battalions; I shall keep at a distance from the firing, if, with your accustomed bravery, you carry confusion and disorder into the enemy's ranks; but if victory be for a moment doubtful, you shall see your Emperor expose himself to the first blows; for victory cannot hesitate, on this day, in which the honour of the French infantry, which is of so much importance to the whole nation, is concerned. Let not the ranks be thinned under pretext of carrying off the wounded, and let each be well persuaded, that we must conquer these hirelings of England, who are animated with so deep a hatred to our nation. This victory will finish our campaign, and we shall resume our winter quarters, where we shall be joined by the new armies forming in France; then the peace, which I will make, will be worthy of my people, of you, and of me. (Signed) NAPOLEON.

PROCLAMATION.

Soldiers,—I am satisfied with you. In the battle of Austerlitz, you have justified what I expected from your intrepidity. You have covered yourselves with eternal glory. An army of 100,000 men, which was commanded by the Emperors of Russia and Austria, has been, in less than four hours, either cut off or dispersed. What escaped your swords have thrown themselves into the lakes.——Forty stand of colours, the standards of the Russian imperial guard, 120 pieces of cannon, twenty generals, and above 30,000 prisoners, are the fruits of this ever-memorable battle.—That infantry, so celebrated, and superior to you in numbers, has proved unable to resist your charge, and, henceforth, you have no rivals to fear.——Thus, in less than two months, the third coalition is conquered and dissolved. Peace cannot be at a great distance; but, as I promised to my people, before crossing the Rhine, I will conclude it only upon terms consistent with my pledge, and which shall secure not only the indemnification, but the reward, of my allies.—Soldiers! When the French people placed the Imperial crown upon my head, I trusted to you to enable me to maintain it in that high splendour of glory, which alone could give it value in my estimation, but at that moment our enemies entertained the design to tarnish and degrade it; and the Iron Crown, which was gained by the blood of so many Frenchmen, they would have compelled me to place on the head of my bitterest foe; an extravagant and foolish proposal, which you have brought to nought, on the anniversary of your Emperor's coronation. You have taught them, that it is easier for them to defy and to threaten, than to subdue us.——Soldiers! When every thing necessary to the security, the happiness, and prosperity of our country has been achieved, will I return you my thanks in France. Then will you be the objects of my tenderest care. My people

will receive you with rapture and joy. To say to me—' I was in the battle of Austerlitz,'—will be enough to authorise the reply—' That is a brave man.' (Signed) NAPOLEON. Head-quarters at Austerlitz, Dec. 3, 1805.

Circular Letter to the Bishops and Presidents of the Consistory. Dated Austerlitz, Dec. 3

The signal victory which has attended our arms over the combined armies of Russia and Austria, commanded by the Emperors of Austria and Russia in person, is a visible proof of the protection of God, and requires that solemn thanksgiving be celebrated throughout the whole extent of our empire.—We hope, that such marked successes as those we have obtained at Austerlitz, will induce our enemies at length to give up the perfidious councils of England, the only means that can insure peace to the Continent.—Upon receipt of these presents, you will, according to custom, sing a *Te Deum*; at which it is our intention, that all the constituted authorities, and our people, assist. This being the whole object of our letter, we pray God to have you in his holy keeping. (Signed) NAPOLEON. Bishop of the Diocese of ——.

Armistice concluded between their Majesties the Emperors of the French and Austria. Done at Austerlitz, Dec. 6, 1805.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and his Majesty the Emperor of Germany, being desirous of coming to definitive negociations, in order to put an end to a war which has devastated both their dominions, have previously agreed upon an armistice, to exist till the conclusion of a definitive peace, or the rupture of the negotiations. In the latter case, hostilities shall not recommence within fourteen days; and the cessation of the armistice shall then be announced to the plenipotentiaries of both powers, at the head-quarters of their respective armies.—Art. I. The line of both armies shall be in Moravia, the Circle of Iglau, the Circle of Znaim, the Circle of Brunn, a part of the Circle of Olmutz, upon the right bank of the little river of Trezebo:ka, before Prostnitz, to the spot where that river discharges itself into the Marck; and the right bank of the Marck to the junction of that river with the Danube, Presburg being included. No French nor Austrian troops shall, on any occasion, be stationed within five or six leagues of Haliteh, upon the right bank of the Marck. Further, the line of both armies shall include in the territory to be occupied by the French army, all Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, the State of Venice, Carinthia, Styria, Carniola, the County of Goritz and Istria, and lastly in Bohemia, the Circle of Montabor, and the whole space to the eastward, from Tabor to Lintz.—Art. 2. The Russian army shall evacuate the Austrian States, with Austrian Poland, viz. Moravia and Hungary, within the period of fifteen days, and Gallicia within a month. The routes shall be prescribed to the Russian army, that it may be always known where they are, as well as to prevent any misunderstanding.—Art. 3. There shall be no levy en mass, or insurrection in Hungary, nor any extraordinary recruiting for troops in Bohemia, nor shall any foreign army be permitted to enter the territory of the house of Austria. The negociations for both powers shall meet at Nicolsburg, for the immediate commencement of negociations, in order to effect, without delay, the re-establishment of peace and a good understanding between the two Emperors. The duplicates of this instrument are hereby signed by us, Marshal Berthier, Minister of War, Major General of the Grand Army, Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy, and Prince John of Lichtenstein, Lieutenant-General and Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, &c. MARSHAL BERTHIER, J. PRINCE of LICHTENSTEIN, Lieut.-Gen.

NAPLES.—*Royal Decree issued at Naples November 20, 1805.*

The arrival of an Anglo-Russian squadron in this road having given occasion to a report, that the legation and the French consulate had removed the arms of their Sovereign, &c. to the great displeasure of his Sicilian Majesty; and as it is presumed, that the persons concerned in the commerce of Italy, Liguria, Batavia, &c. may be alarmed for the safety of their property in his Majesty's estates, his Majesty has authorised me to communicate to the Exchange, in his royal name, that, whatever may be the consequence of this event, the property of the said nations, the allies of France, shall remain under the protection of the government; and that his Majesty will also permit them to continue their commerce in every respect, just the same as if the legation and consulate continued in the exercise of their functions.—To prevent any misunderstanding, this guarantee is not understood as extending beyond the continents of his Majesty's kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. (Signed) LOUIS DE MEDICI. Done at the Palace, Nov. 20, 1805.

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